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Abstract: This article contributes to the ongoing and growing scholarly conversation concerning how best to 
define the term “genocide” following Raphael Lemkin’s coining of the term in 1944. The article first shows 
that the Convention definition ratified in Paris in 1948 was intended solely for juridical purposes and does 
not reflect Lemkin’s deeper understanding of genocide. It then surveys a range of scholarship after Lemkin 
that argues for alternative definitions of term or even calls for jettisoning the term altogether. While it is 
acknowledged that a clear definition is imperative in a juridical context, it is argued that there are problems 
and even dangers in demanding definitional precision. For purposes of coming to terms with the multi-
dimensionality and complexities of genocidal events or the genocidal process, Wittgenstein’s notion of family 
resemblance provides an alternative way of seeing genocide that avoids the dangers of definition.
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Introduction
A great deal of scholarly attention is devoted to the issue of how best to define the term genocide. 
The term was coined and defined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944, and the definition finally adopted at 
the U.N. Convention on 9 December 1948 reads as follows:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.1
As we will see in the next section, this definition was intended solely for purposes of international 
law. And there are numerous critics of this definition; critics of the Convention definition fall 
into one of four camps. Some claim there are problems with the term as a juridical concept; it is 
notoriously difficult to establish intent, and the Convention definition specifies only five groups. 
Juridical problems notwithstanding, other argue that for purposes of prevention, we need to see 
genocide as a process rather than as an event and revise the definition accordingly. Still others 
claim the term, or more precisely the Convention definition of the term, does not facilitate a deeper 
understanding of the complexities or even chaos that characterize genocides. Still others advocate 
jettisoning the term altogether; scholars in this camp have offered any number of alternative terms 
and phrases meant to capture the depth and magnitude of genocidal violence.
This paper begins with a brief overview of how Lemkin himself intended and understood the 
term genocide as it appears in the Convention definition in contrast to his historical understanding 
of genocide and shows that his definition adopted in 1948 as a legal concept should not be 
conflated with his historical understanding of genocide. We will then evaluate the arguments of 
critics who wish to amend, correct, or even replace Lemkin’s term. We will see that criticisms of the 
Convention definition along with calls for an improved or alternative definition share an all-too-
familiar received understanding of definition itself. This received conception of definition goes as 
far back as Plato. Rather than having recourse to alternative definitions of genocide or inventing a 
1 “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/Volume%2078/volume-78-I-1021-English.pdf (accessed 31 January 2016).
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new term, the argument presented here shows that Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances 
provides an alternative and effective way of looking at genocide.
Defining Genocide
Lemkin’s Term
Genocide scholars do recognize an immeasurable debt to Raphael Lemkin for coining the term 
genocide—the word derives from the Greek word genos, or people, and the Latin cide, to kill—as 
well as his tireless efforts to make genocide a crime under international law. Passages throughout 
the published and unpublished writings make it clear that he considered it his vocation or métier 
to criminalize genocide. In an article published in the American Journal of International Law Lemkin 
makes this clear when he writes, “The realities of European life in the years 1933-45 call for the 
creation of such a term and for the formulation of a legal concept of destruction of human groups.”2 
He writes in his never completed autobiography Totally Unofficial:
Thus my basic mission in life was formulated: to create a law among nations to protect 
national, racial, and religious groups from destruction. The need for the innocent to be 
protected set off a chain reaction in my mind. It followed me all my life. Once I conceived of 
the destruction of groups as a crime, I could not rest quietly. Neither could I stop thinking 
about it. When I later coined the word “genocide,” I found too an expression for my own use, 
but at the same time I was prepared to work more for the actual transformation of this word 
into the subject of an international treaty.3 
A few pages later he continues:
Now was the time to outlaw the destruction of national, racial, and religious groups. I 
thought that the crime was so big that nothing less than declaring it an international offense 
would be adequate, and that it should be done by international treaty or convention.4
Not always fully recognized or appreciated in the scholarship is the fact that as an intellectual 
and scholar, Lemkin had a far richer understanding of genocide and the history of genocide than 
is suggested by the 1948 Convention definition. It is clear when looking at his other writings 
including unpublished material that he recognized the idea of genocide, even before being named 
and defined, was far more complex and multidimensional than the Convention definition might 
suggest. He recognized that genocide is as old as human history and a ubiquitous feature of human 
history, and not essentially tied to the logic of modernity, although he clearly saw the Holocaust as 
ushering in new aspects of genocide. He recognized that it involves far more than the mass murder 
of human beings. He recognized that genocides look different at different times depending on the 
contingencies of history.
Here is not the place to provide a detailed account of the development of Lemkin’s understanding 
of genocidal violence.5 Still, we must recognize, if however briefly, that there are passages in his 
2 Lemkin, Raphael. 1947. “Genocide as a Crime under International Law.” The American Journal of International Law Vol. 41, 
No. 1, 146.
3 Lemkin, Raphael. 2013. Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin. Translated by Donna-Lee Frieze. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2.
4 Ibid, 22.
5 There is a growing and promising body of scholarship devoted to Lemkin and his understanding of genocide. See: 
Moses, A. Dirk. 2010. “Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide. In The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies. 
Edited by Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, pages 19- 41. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Butcher, Thomas A. 2013. 
“A ‘Synchronized Attack’: On Raphael Lemkin’s Holistic Conception of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research Vol. 15, 
No. 3, 25-271; Irvin-Erickson, Douglas. 2013. “A Genocide, the Family of Mind, and the Romantic Signature of Raphael 
Lemkin,” Journal of Genocide Research Vol.15, No. 3, 273-296; Siegelberg, Mira L. 2013. “Unofficial Men, Efficient Civil 
Servants: Raphael Lemkin in the History of International Law,” Journal of Genocide Research Vol. 15, No. 3, 297-316; Earl, 
Hilary. 2013. “Prosecuting Genocide before the Genocide Convention: Raphael Lemkin and the Nuremberg Trials, 1945-
1949.” Journal of Genocide Research Vol. 15, No. 3, 317-337.
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published and unpublished writings that document a much subtler and nuanced understanding of 
genocidal violence than is evident in the Convention definition. His richly historical understanding 
of genocide is evident in an article published in the Christian Science Monitor in 1948: 
The destruction of Carthage, the destruction of the Albigenses and Waldenses, the Crusades, 
the march of the Teutonic Knights, the destruction of the Christians under the Ottoman 
Empire, the massacres of the Herero in Africa, the extermination of the Armenians, the 
slaughter of the Christian Assyrians in Iraq in 1933, the destruction of the Maronites, the 
pogroms of Jews in Tsarist Russia and Romania—all these are classical cases.6
And in an undated and unpublished manuscript he refers to genocide as being “as old as 
history,” although it is “repeating itself with an increasing intensity in our time.”7 
Moreover, Lemkin’s more inclusive historical understanding of genocide also meant that he 
distinguished different types of genocide based on the perpetrators’ intentions and purposes: he 
recognized that some genocides were intended to totally destroy a group; others were intended to 
destroy a culture through assimilation and other measures; third, some genocides seek to annihilate 
both members of the group and destroy the culture as well.8 An example of the second type would 
be the genocidal rape camps in Bosnia where women were forced to bear children who bore the 
ethnicity of perpetrators. An example of the third type would be the destruction of Armenian 
architecture by the Turks well after the killing and diaspora.
Clearly, the enduring legacy of Raphael Lemkin is that of Lemkin the jurist who framed the 
Convention definition, not Lemkin the scholar. This is likely best explained by the urgency he felt 
about proscribing genocide at the level of international law. Although he was enough of a realist 
to recognize that an international law proscribing genocide would not end genocide, he felt a real 
resolve to make it law while the memories of the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust were vivid 
in our memory. In a memorandum he writes about the need for ratification without delay: “It is 
easier to ratify a treaty of this kind while the memory of recent cases of genocide is still In [sic] our 
minds.”9
Do We Need a New Definition? Do We Need a Definition at All?
That we need a definition is taken almost as a given and the importance of a clear definition is often 
stressed in the literature. Totten and Parsons in their introduction to the fourth edition of Centuries 
of Genocide, stress the importance of clear definitions, albeit within the context of teaching about 
genocide. In a section entitled “More specifics vis-à-vis teaching and learning about genocide,” 
they claim this: “First, it is absolutely essential to help students understand the difference between 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. A key way to do that is 
to provide them with a solid definition of each...”10 Totten and Parsons, and a host of others 
see a solid definition as central to our understanding of genocide. George Andreopoulos, in his 
introduction to Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, makes perhaps the strongest claim 
for the importance of a sound definition. According to Andreopoulos:
The quest for a comprehensive definition would enable us first to map out the area within 
which the concept is to operate; an analytically rigorous definition could then be developed 
which would avoid conceptual overstretch. Because the concept refers to a social process, a 
6 Lemkin, Raphael. 1947. “War against Genocide.” Christian Science Monitor, 20.
7 Lemkin, Raphael. Undated. “Memorandum on the necessity for the urgent ratification of the Genocide Convention.” 
Raphael Lemkin Collection; P-154, box 6, folder 2. American Jewish Historical Society, New York and Boston.
8 Feierstein, Daniel. 2014. Genocide as Social Practice: Reorganizing Society under the Nazis and Argentina’s Military Juntas. 
Translated by Douglas Andrew Town. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 40.
9 Lemkin, Raphael. Undated. “Memorandum on the necessity for the urgent ratification of the Genocide Convention,” 
undated, Raphael Lemkin Collection; P-154; box 6; folder 2; American Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY, and 
Boston, MA.
10 Totten, Samuel and William S. Parsons, editors. 2013. Centuries of Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Accounts Fourth 
Edition. New York: Routledge, 11.
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good definition has a critical functional value: to assist in the detection of early signs of an 
impending crisis and, provided the appropriate mechanisms are in place, devise preventive 
measures. Thus a good definition can be instrumental in the creation of an early warning 
system for the detection of genocide-prone situations. Finally, a proper conceptual framework 
should be able to explain nonevents: It should provide insights into why genocide-prone 
situations did not develop into full-scale genocides, and why societies that had that had 
witnessed large-scale genocidal massacres in the past managed to achieve relative stability 
without any structural changes in the perpetrator regime.11 
Andreopoulos devotes nearly half of his book to articles that focus on what he calls “the conceptual 
dimensions of genocide.” 
Irving Louis Horowitz similarly devotes the first chapter of Taking Lives to the importance 
of a definition while delineating the problems surrounding a definition of the term.12 According 
to Horowitz, “formal definitions are either too broad to invite action or too narrow to require 
any [and] political definitions invariably mean what other nations do to subject populations, never 
what one’s own does to its subjects or citizens.”13 The myriad of problems with defining genocide 
that Horowitz discusses notwithstanding, he still stresses the importance of a “multidimensional 
definition of genocide.”14
Proposed New Definitions
That we need not only a definition but a new definition is suggested by the fact that there is so 
much scholarship devoted to either redefining Lemkin’s term, replacing it with a better term, or 
jettisoning the term altogether. 
Working within the juridical framework, Larry May has recently addressed deficiencies in 
the Convention definition and the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute of 1998, and made 
specific proposed changes.15 May focuses in particular on how best to conceive of groups and group 
identification given that both the Convention definition and the Rome Statute define genocide 
as a crime perpetrated against groups. May characterizes groups as follows: “Metaphysically 
the identity conditions of a group are: (1) individual human persons, (2) related to each other by 
organizational structure, solidarity, or common interests, and (3) identifiable, to the members, and 
to those who observe the members, by characteristic features.”16 It is the third condition, what he 
calls the “publicity condition” that is important in the context of defining genocide.
One of the major strengths of May’s conceptualization of groups he mentions specifically: “the 
number of groups that would be officially recognized as the potential objects of genocide would 
increase from the current four: racial, religious, ethnic, and national groups.”17 A related strength, 
and one not specifically discussed by May, but still important, is this: it is easy to imagine an event 
in the future that might well qualify as a case of genocide but not involve one of the four identified 
groups, or a group we can at this historical moment not easily imagine as a victim group. May’s 
analysis enables us to recognize genocidal violence against a group or groups for which there is no 
historical precedent.18
11 Andreopoulos, George J. 1997. “Introduction: The Calculus of Genocide.” In Genocide: Conceptual and Historical 
Dimensions. Edited by George Andreopoulos. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 3-4.
12 Irving Louis Horowitz is right, in my view, to point out that understanding and defining genocide is made especially 
difficult owing to the fact that it belies Western conceptions of law and morals which emphasize the culpability of 
individual agents and not groups: Horowitz, Irving Louis. 2002. Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power Fifth edition. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
13 Horowitz, Irving Louis. 2002. Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power Fifth edition. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 14.
14 Ibid, 27.
15 May, Larry. 2011. Genocide: A Normative Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
16 Ibid, 50.
17 Ibid, 50.
18 A number of scholars have focused attention on how we should understand the notion of groups in the Convention 
definition, which provides insight as to why Lemkin himself saw groups as substantial entities. See: May, Genocide: A 
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Still, May is working within the juridical framework. His focus is “in solving the definitional 
problem that has so vexed tribunals, convention drafters, courts, and international commission 
members for many years.”19 But we need also to confront the definitional issues outside of the 
juridical context in our attempts to understand genocide.
Outside the juridical context, there is a spectrum of approaches to defining genocide. There are 
those such as Yehuda Bauer,20 Steven T. Katz,21 and even Irving Horowitz22 who want to privilege 
the Holocaust as a unique historical event, fundamentally different than other cases of mass 
brutality, and define genocide accordingly.23 At the other end of the spectrum are those such as 
Israel Charny who opt for a much broader definition: Charny argues for what he calls a “generic 
definition of genocide.” In his view:
What is needed...is a generic definition of genocide that does not exclude or commit to 
indifference any case of mass murder of any human beings, of whatever racial, national, 
ethnic, biological, cultural, religious, and political definitions, or of totally mixed groupings 
of any and all of the above. I propose that whenever large numbers of unarmed human 
beings are put to death at the hands of their fellow human beings, we are talking about 
genocide.24 
Others frame a definition explicitly in terms of necessary conditions, i.e. in terms of what must 
be the case for an event to qualify as a case of genocide. Inga Clendinnen, for example, has claimed 
that “to take murder out of genocide is to render it vacuous” a claim contested by Raimond Gaita.25 
Even an expansive definition matrix such as the one proposed by Charny, focuses on killing as a 
necessary condition. Much of the scholarship that focuses on a traditional definition will cast intent 
as a necessary condition for an event to be considered genocide. The Convention definition uses 
the language of intent to destroy. Michael Ignatieff, in a lecture in honour of Lemkin, refers to the 
Holocaust as “an ideological desire to wipe a people from the face of the earth, and to grind salt 
into the earth, so that they would never arise and grow again.” Genocide, he continues, “has no 
clear meaning whatsoever unless the word can be connected to a clear intention to exterminate a 
human group in whole or in part.”26
Claudia Card offers an alternative conceptualization of genocide by focusing on what she 
terms social death. She claims, “the intentional production of social death in a people or community 
is the central evil of genocide.”27 Mohammed Abed similarly claims “social death is the harm 
that distinguishes genocide from other forms of political violence.”28 For Card and Abed, what 
Normative Account; Boghossian, Paul. 2010a. “The Concept of Genocide.” Journal of Genocide Research Vol. 12, No. 1-2, 69-
80; Irvin-Erickson, “A Genocide, the Family of Mind and the Romantic Signature of Raphael Lemkin”; Moses, “Raphael 
Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide”.
19 May, Genocide, 58.
20 Bauer, Yehuda. 1984. “The Place of the Holocaust in Contemporary History.” Studies in Contemporary Jewry Vol. 1, No. 3, 
201-224.
21 Katz, Steven T. 1981. “The ‘Unique’ Intentionality of the Holocaust.” Modern Judaism Vol. 1, No. 2, 161-183; Katz, Steven 
T. 1994. The Holocaust in Historical Context: Volume I: The Holocaust and Mass Death Before the Modern Age. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
22 Horowitz, Taking Lives.
23 There is a growing trend in the scholarship to attempt integrating Holocaust Studies with Genocide Studies. Universiteit 
van Amsterdam offered a summer seminar titled “Hidden Genocides: Overshadowed by the Holocaust in the summer of 
2015; see also, Blatman, Daniel. 2015.
24 Charny, Israel. 1994. “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide.” In Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimension. Edited 
by George Andreopoulos. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 74.
25 Clendinnen, Inga. 2003. The Australian’s Review of Books. Quoted in Gaita, Raimond. 2005. “Refocusing Genocide.” In 
Genocide and Human Rights: A Philosophical Guide. Edited by John K. Roth. New York: Palgrave, 156.
26 Ignatieff, Michael. 2000. “The Legacy of Raphael Lemkin.” Speech delivered at the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum. http://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/speakers-and-events/all-speakers-and-events/the-legacy-of-raphael-
lemkin (accessed 16 December 2015).
27 Card, Claudia. 2010. Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 237.
28 Abed, Mohammed. 2006. “Clarifying the Concept of Genocide.” Metaphilosophy Vol. 37, No. 3-4, 308-330.
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gives meaning to our lives are relationships, relationships that can be personal or institutionally 
mediated, contemporary or intergenerational; and while a life deprived of social vitality is not 
necessarily meaningless (here Card cites spiritual vitality), still she claims “loss of social vitality 
is a profound loss.”29 Moreover, she claims, “putting social death at the center of genocide takes 
the focus off body counts, individual careers cut short, and mourners. It puts the focus instead on 
relationships, connections, and foundational institutions that create community and set the context 
that gives meaning to careers and goals, lives and deaths.”30 Card’s conceptualization represents a 
shift in focus, and it seems that she does not offer a definition per se; she does, however, state that 
while “social death is not necessarily genocide...genocide is social death.” And it is “social death 
that distinguishes the evil of genocide, morally, from the evils of other mass murders.”31
Card’s focus on social death certainly complements many of the testimonies of survivors as 
well as literature and film about life in the camps. Jean Améry’s intellectual alienation in the camp, 
his reduction to the purely physical, and his exile from his homeland is a clear example of social 
death.32 Imre Kertész’s narrator in Kaddish for an Unborn Child who refuses to bring a child into the 
post-Auschwitz world is another clear illustration of the lived experience of social death. 33
Daniel Feierstein, following a relatively thorough review and criticisms of the more canonical 
definitions of genocide, argues in the case of modern genocides (he bases his analysis on the 
Holocaust and Argentina’s military juntas) defines genocide as a social practice, a technology of 
power that is “the execution of a large-scale and systematic plan with the intention of destroying a human 
group as such in whole or in part,” as a way of reorganizing society.34
Those writing with a focus on preventing genocide have begun focusing on reconceptualizing 
genocide as a process. Gregory Stanton has focused our attention on genocide as a process by 
identifying 10 distinct stages.35 The central argument of the 2000 African Union Report, The Preventable 
Genocide, is that the Rwandan genocide can be traced back 150 years to Belgian colonialism and the 
role of the Catholic Church.36 Sheri Rosenberg, like Stanton, focuses on prevention which, in her 
view, is greatly facilitated by seeing genocide as a process and not an event. She argues for what 
she calls genocide by attrition, a type of process-based view. As she explains, we should be mindful 
“of the fact that genocide is a fluid and complex social phenomenon, not a static term.”37 This 
represents a promising new direction in the field of genocide studies and one that complements 
the approach I will argue for later in this paper.
Still others argue there are fundamental problems with the very concept of genocide. Rather 
than focusing on the shortcomings of particular definitions, David Moshman directs our attention 
to problems inherent in the very notion of conceptualization as it relates to the concept of genocide. 
He demonstrates the dangers inherent in what he calls, proto-type” concepts—the Shoah is his 
example—where all other possible instances are judged against the proto-typical case; he argues 
instead for what he calls formal concepts which appeal to a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. While he vastly prefers the formal over the proto-typical, he sees dangers there as well. 
For Moshman, “we cannot escape the constraints inherent in conceptual thought,” yet we can, 
he argues, “always transcend the limitations of our current concepts.”38 Christian Gerlach casts a 
29 Card. Confronting Evils, 237.
30 Ibid, 238.
31 Ibid, 237.
32 Améry, Jean. 1980. At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor and its Realities. Translated by Sidney Rosenfeld and 
Stella P. Rosenfeld. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
33 Kertész, Imre. 2004. Kaddish for an Unborn Child. Translated by Tim Wilkinson. New York: Random House.
34 Feierstein. Genocide as Social Practice, 36.
35 Stanton, Gregory. undated. Genocide Watch. http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/tenstagesofgenocide.html 
(accessed December 15, 2015).
36 African Union. 2000. Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide. Available from: http://www.refworld.org African /
docid/4d1da8752.html (accessed 16 May 2015)
37 Rosenberg, Sheri P. 2012. “Genocide is a Process, Not an Event.” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal. 
Vol. 7, No. 1, 17.
38 Moshman, David. 2001. “Conceptual Constraints on Thinking about Genocide, Journal of Genocide Research. Vol. 3, 431.
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much wider net, seeing problems with how genocide scholarship often limits our understanding 
of mass violence. The main problem with the traditional framework, according to Gerlach, “is that 
genocide is a normative, action-oriented concept that has historically and essentially been created 
for political struggle not for scholarly analysis.”39 He calls it a politischer Kampfbergriff and instead 
argues of an alternative concept, namely, “extremely violent societies,” which he claims overcomes 
specific problems with the concept of genocide, namely: it excludes many forms of violence which 
have important links to genocide; traditional genocide scholarship is overly focused on the state; 
and it fails to sufficiently recognize the “multi-causal explanations of violence.”40
Given the fact that the term genocide has only been part of our vocabulary for just over 
65 years, it is alarming that there are some who want to jettison the term altogether. Stuart 
Stein proposes that we jettison the term claiming that “the concept genocide cannot be rescued 
for use as a viable category type describing a delimited cluster of behaviours, and that 
assimilating yet more instances to this category achieves little more than name-calling.”41 Paul 
Boghossian is perhaps the most polemical in this regard. He claims unequivocally, “(a) that 
the concept defined by the UN Convention is deeply flawed; and (b) that there are no good 
remedies to these flaws.”42 More recently, Antonio Ferrara has suggested a new way of 
understanding mass violence and proposes using the term demographic surgery for the purpose of 
historical understanding.43
The Danger of Definitions
This review of proposed alternative definitions, a review that is admittedly not exhaustive but 
rather representative, shows recourse to a received and uncontested conception of definition that 
goes back at least to Socrates and Plato, and remained unchallenged until the twentieth century 
by Ludwig Wittgenstein. I want to briefly discuss Socrates’ conception of definition followed 
by Wittgenstein’s critique of the Socratic understanding. This will in turn allow us to see clearly 
dangers in attempting to define genocide in the traditional way and why Wittgenstein’s notion of 
family resemblances is a more effective way of thinking about genocidal violence.
Socrates’ Demand for a Standard
Within a juridical context a clear definition is imperative. Outside of this context, however, it is a 
different matter. Rather than addressing individual arguments that propose alternative definitions 
I wish to contest the claim that we need a definition at all. In fact, and especially in the case of 
genocide, there lurk dangers in demanding definitional clarity. We need to look at our received 
notion of definition itself for therein lies a crucial set of problems. All of the proposed definitions 
of genocide reviewed in the previous section share a common conception or understanding of 
39 Gerlach, Christian. 2006. “Extremely Violent Societies: An Alternative to the Concept of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide 
Research. Vol. 8, 463-464.
40 Ibid, 464-465.
41 Stein, Stuart D. 2005. “Conceptions and Terms: Templates for Analysis of Holocausts and Genocides.” Journal of Genocide 
Research, Vol. 7, 171-203.
42 Boghossian, Paul. 2010b. “Response to my Critics.” Journal of Genocide Research Vol. 12, No. 1-2, 109. This follows 
criticisms of his earlier paper. See Boghossian, “The Concept of Genocide”. There are two concerns about these claims. 
First, it is notoriously difficult to prove a negative, e.g. that “there are no good remedies,” unless the term is conceptually 
incoherent or self-contradictory. If this is what Boghossian is claiming, then he has failed to make the case. Alternatively, 
if he means to be making an a posteriori claim to the effect that to date the flaws have not been remedied, he would need 
to provide a survey of all attempts to redefine or re-conceptualize and this he has not done. A second worry concerns 
his earlier claim that “genocide is a coined technical term [which] implies that anyone using it must either use it to mean 
this technical concept or must explicitly supply an alternative definition. One cannot use the word ‘genocide’ without 
supplying some definition or other, because one cannot rely, as one might with a word in ordinary language, on some 
common understanding that we all have of that word, whether or not we are able to define it” (Boghossian, “The Concept 
of Genocide”, 70). Yet he begins the same essay by claiming “the word ‘genocide’ gets a lot of use these days” (68). This 
suggests that the term is part of natural language. In the next section I will develop my argument to the effect that this is 
precisely where we should begin, with a careful mapping and analysis of how the term is used.
43 Ferrara, Antonio. 2015. “Beyond Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: A New Way to Understand Mass Violence.” Journal of 
Genocide Research Vol. 17, 1-20.
Don’t Think But Look
©2016     Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 3 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.3.1308
161
definition. In this section I will analyse our received understanding of a definition and show the 
dangers in applying that received understanding to the concept of genocide. 
When Socrates and Euthyphro by chance meet at the King Archon’s court, Socrates seems on 
the face of it astonished to learn that the young Euthyphro is there at the court to charge someone 
with murder. Socrates says to Euthyphro: “Heracles! Surely, Euthyphro, most people do not know 
where the right lies; for I fancy it is not everyone who can rightly do what you are doing, but only 
one who is already very far advanced in wisdom.”44 Socrates is even more alarmed to learn that 
Euthyphro is prosecuting his own father. Socrates then says, “But, in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, 
do you think your knowledge about divine laws and holiness and unholiness is so exact that, when 
the facts are as you say, you are not afraid of doing something unholy yourself in prosecuting your 
father for murder?”45 With no trace of either irony or humility, Euthyphro assures Socrates that 
he does possess sufficient knowledge of the pious and the impious so as to be able prosecute his 
father. He therefore asks Euthyphro for a definition of holiness and unholiness: “What do you say 
is the nature of piety and impiety, both in relation to murder and to other things? Is not holiness 
always the same with itself in every action and, on the other hand, is not unholiness the opposite 
of all holiness, always the same with itself and whatever is to be unholy possessing some one 
characteristic quality?”46
It is clear in the dialogue that Socrates is asking Euthyphro not just for a definition (Euthyphro 
offers any number of definitions), but a certain kind of definition. We know early on in the dialogue 
what definitions will not suffice. Euthyphro’s initial answer to the question of what is holiness—
“well then, I say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrongdoer who 
commits murder or steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father, or 
your mother or anyone else, and not prosecuting him is unholy”47—is rejected by Socrates as less 
than adequate. “Now call to mind,” says Socrates, “that this is not what I asked you, to tell me one 
or two of the many holy acts, but to tell the essential aspect, by which all holy acts are holy.”48 Here 
Socrates is asking for an explanation of “the general idea.” And a moment later, Socrates asks for a 
standard: “Tell me then what this aspect is, that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as 
a model and, if anything you or anyone else does agrees with it, may say that the act is holy, and 
if not, that it is unholy.”49
This way of characterizing a definition of a concept is later embraced by Aristotle as well.50 
“Aristotle,” claims Forster, “basically took over this theory from Plato, and due to the combined 
influence of these two great philosophers it went on to exercise a profound and lasting impact 
on Western thought—so that, for example, even today many philosophers and non-philosophers 
alike still labour under the impression that in order to have a clear understanding of a general 
term a person must be able to provide a definition of it.”51 This is borne out when we review the 
scholarship on genocide. 
A Wittgensteinian Critique
With Socrates’ conception of an adequate definition illustrated we can now turn to Wittgenstein 
to see just how problematic this conception is, drawing primarily from the Philosophical Investigations, 
but secondarily the Cambridge Lectures: 1932-35. The Investigations is where Wittgenstein, following 
a discussion of language games, introduces the provocative notion of family resemblances, or 
44 Plato. 1966. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Volume 1. Translated by Harold North Fowler. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 4a-b.
45 Ibid, 4e.
46 Ibid, 5c-d.
47 Ibid, 5d-e.
48 Ibid, 6d.
49 Ibid, 6e.
50 Aristotle. 1999. The Metaphysics. Penguin Classics edition. New York: Penguin Classics.
51 Forster, Michael. 2010. “Wittgenstein on Family Resemblance Concepts.” In Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: A 
Critical Guide. Edited by Arif Amhed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 77. 
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Familienähnlichkeiten. This notion of family resemblances starkly contrasts with what Socrates 
demands of his interlocutors.
In a famous passage, Wittgenstein introduces a list, not meant to be exhaustive, of examples of 
language-games for us to consider. Here is Wittgenstein’s list:
“Giving orders, and acting on them— 
Describing an object by its appearance, or by its measurements— 
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)— 
Reporting an event— 
Speculating about the event— 
Forming and testing a hypothesis— 
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams— 
Making up a story; and reading one— 
Acting in a play— 
Singing rounds— 
Guessing riddles— 
Cracking a joke; telling one— 
Solving a problem in applied arithmetic— 
Translating from one language into another— 
Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.”52
Not only is the list not exhaustive, it is likewise not fixed: “This diversity is not something 
fixed, given once and for all; but new types of language, new language games, as we may say, come 
into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.”53
How are we to make sense of language-games? This question is complicated by the fact, as 
indicated above, that language games are multifarious and not fixed; they come into existence and 
pass out of existence. Plato and the tradition that follows would insist on a definition of language, 
a common feature shared by all language games, a definition of language that transcends all 
examples of games, or alternatively, the uses of language. Wittgenstein anticipates this worry and 
casts it in the form of an objection: “For someone might object against me: ‘You make things easy 
for yourself! You talk about all sorts of language games, but have nowhere said what is essential 
[Wesentliche] to a language-game, and so to language. So you let yourself off the very part of the 
investigation that once gave you the most headache, the part about the general form of the proposition 
and of language’.”54 
In response to this anticipated objection he replies: “I’m saying that these phenomena have 
no one thing in common in virtue of which we use the same word for all—but there are many 
different kinds of affinity [Verwandschaft] between them.”55 Then at PI §66 he uses the concept of 
a game to illustrate further the relationship among uses. After mentioning any number of games, 
e.g. board games, card games, etc. he claims that there is nothing common to all games by virtue of 
which we call them games. He then says to one who would insist that they must have something 
in common: “look and see whether there is anything common to all.”56 The look and see test, 
Wittgenstein suggests, will reveal that there is nothing common to all but instead “a complicated 
network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small.”57 
The expression he uses to capture this network of similarities is family resemblance.58 John Wisdom 
reminds us in his recollection of lectures he attended and conversations he had with Wittgenstein 
52 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009. Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations). Translated by G.E.M Anscombe, 
P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Revised fourth edition. Chickchester: Wiley-Blackwell, §23.
53 Ibid, §23.
54 Ibid, §64.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid, §66.
58 Ibid, §67.
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between 1934 and 1937, “He said that in applying the same word to several instances we mark 
a family resemblance—not the possession of something in common (as all ticket holders possess 
something in common—a ticket which matches a ticket I may hold in hand...). And this connects 
to his saying: ‘Don’t ask for the meaning, ask for the use.’”59 Even without a general definition we 
can still explain to someone what a game is. The author thinks that replacing a Platonic conception 
of essentialism with a conception of family resemblances can address a number of philosophical 
problems and conundrums. 
First, Wittgenstein helps us to see that there are intractable problems with the essentialist 
model of definitions. One problem with the essentialist model of definitions is the untenable 
philosophical commitments it involves. When Socrates presses Euthyphro for a proper definition 
he is asking for the Form of holiness, anticipating Plato’s theory of Forms or Ideas. In other words, 
he is asking for something that transcends any particular instantiation of the general concept. In 
fact, it presupposes an abstract general form that is not immanent but transcendent. This entails a 
commitment to presuppositions both metaphysical and epistemological. Metaphysically it involves 
a commitment to an ontological realm of Ideas or Forms that are not part of the immanent domain. 
Epistemologically, it makes knowledge of the transcendent realm difficult if not impossible to 
achieve. It is worth noting that Socrates in collaboration with his interlocutors is never able to 
define a concept in a way that would meet his own demands. Historically Plato sets in motion the 
2500 year long philosophical project of attempting to find access to, and knowledge of, a realm 
that is more real and lies behind the world of mere appearance. This represents a philosophical 
prejudice that Wittgenstein wants to dispel as a fool’s errand. 
Additionally, Wittgenstein wants us to focus on the immanent domain and look carefully at 
how words and concepts are used by language users. If we are to take careful account—employing 
what I am calling the look and see test—we will begin to see that, in the words of Ambrose and 
McDonald, “there is nothing identifiably in common for the state of affairs for which we use a 
word. There are only a number of overlapping resemblances. Our concepts are enormous families 
with various resemblances.”60
This should not, on reflection, at all surprise us. Language users inevitably use language in 
ways that reflect perspectives or outlooks. Within the academic community historians focus more 
on the particular and tell stories about unique events. Stories told about perpetrators look much 
different than stories told from the perspective of victims or survivors. Social scientists focus more 
on general trends and patterns and less on the uniqueness of genocidal events. Charny recognizes 
the same problem when he claims “even in a society where the scientific method is the valued and 
prevailing mode, definitions are subject to enormous ideological and political pressures from the 
societal establishments within which thinkers do the work.”61 In the same article Charny outlines 
distinct ways in which defining the term “genocide” is politicized and rife with difficulties. Jacques 
Sémelin also speaks to the tangle of uses of the term including issues of memory, the urging of 
humanitarian action, and legal purposes.62 
But our inability to arrive at a clear definition of genocide may not be cause for concern for four 
distinct reasons. First, and as already shown, the demand for a clear definition rests on untenable 
philosophical assumptions. Second, given both the perspectivism of different paradigms and the 
politically charged nature of the debate over defining genocide it would follow that any essentialist 
definition that became widely used would likely represent, not truth, but instead the hegemony 
of a dominant discourse; the hegemony of a dominant discourse in turn marginalizes or worse 
silences other voices that deserve attention and recognition. Third, if we adhere to the demand for 
59 Wisdom, John. 1952. “Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1934-1937.” Mind Vol. 61, 259.
60 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2001. Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1932-1935. Edited by Alice Ambrose and Margaret 
McDonald. Amherst: Prometheus, 96.
61 Charny, “Towards a Generic Definition,” 66.
62 Sémelin, Jacques. 2012. “Around the ‘G’ Word: From Raphael Lemkin’s Definition to Current Memorial and Academic 
Controversies,” Genocide Studies and Prevention Vol. 7, No. 1, 24-29. I find nothing of a specific nature, at least at the 
theoretical level, in Wittgenstein’s writings that helps us to combat the political uses of the term genocide, or language 
more generally. I will address this problem more fully in the conclusion.
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definitional precision of the type demanded by Socrates and Plato, we risk narrowing our vision in 
such a way that we may not enrich but rather impoverish our understanding of genocide. We risk 
seeing history filtered through the lens of a definition. Better to bring into our purview the many 
uses of the term in order to refine and deepen our understanding, in order to make us wiser. These 
dangers need to be explicated specifically within the context of genocide.
Specific Dangers in Precisely Defining Genocide
Any essentialist definition will serve both to include and exclude from consideration any number 
of events; recall that Socrates tells Euthyphro that he is looking for a precise standard by which 
to determine what is holy and what is not. Many scholars, as shown earlier, opt for a narrow 
definition of genocide, going in some cases to the extreme of saying the Holocaust or Shoah is the 
only case of genocide in human history. Somewhat less extreme but nevertheless worrisome is the 
claim made by many that the Holocaust is the prototype or paradigm case of genocide, in effect 
claiming that while there are genocides other than the Holocaust, in comparative scholarship, the 
Holocaust is the standard by which all other genocides should be compared and understood. This 
direction in genocide scholarship can be traced to two reasons: first are the issues of memory and 
the understandable desire of a people to have their suffering and the suffering of their ancestors 
recognised as the most egregious agony ever heaped on members of the human community; second 
is the need to cling to the Enlightenment desire to see progress toward a future cosmopolitan 
world bereft of war and genocidal violence.63 The Enlightenment narrative of progress will admit 
eruptions of violence but only if their occurrence is against a backdrop of progress toward peace or 
in Kant, perpetual peace; sustaining that narrative then requires our seeing eruptions of violence as 
aberrational, and much of the genocide scholarship sees individual genocides in just this way. Mark 
Levene, for example, uses the language of an “acute malfunction of not just particular societies but 
of our global community writ large.”64 Horowitz is seemingly more acutely aware of the problems 
surrounding a definition of genocide claiming in a chapter titled, “Defining Genocide” that “a 
multidimensional definition of genocide, rather than a unilinear, moralistic definition painted in 
black and white, is the surest safeguard against impoverished analysis;”65 but he then claims at the 
beginning of the next chapter that “genocide must be clearly distinguished from other forms of the 
destruction of human beings, such as natural disasters, random killings, warfare, and symbolic or 
cultural assaults.”66 Moshman, as discussed above, has given us good reason to avoid the proto-
typical approach. 
There are, however, a number of additional risks in definitionally or methodologically limiting 
our vision, even if we adopt Moshman’s formal approach of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
The first risk lies in hiding from view that which might well enrich and deepen our understanding 
of genocidal violence. We need to see and consider that which lies hidden in the immanent domain, 
that which lies hidden in plain sight.
A second danger in seeking and then being guided in our research by essentialist definitions 
of genocide is that essentialist definitions risk reification and stasis. We must seriously take into 
account that genocidal violence is dynamic and evolving. We may well need to describe events 
in the future as instances of genocidal violence that only bear a family resemblance to genocidal 
violence of the past and present. I would argue as of this writing the current situation in Burundi 
bears a striking family resemblance to the genocide in Rwanda. It would be a grave mistake, as was 
the case of the Rwandan genocide, to debate whether the current violence in Burundi satisfies a 
particular definition of genocide. It might be better to look and see the family resemblance to earlier 
instances of genocidal violence.
The recent scholarship on war is instructive in this regard. Following the attacks on the World 
Trade Center towers on 9/11, then Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, published a piece in 
63 This desire is reflected in Steven Pinker’s book, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence has Declined. 2012. New 
York: Penguin. It might also explain why the book was so well received.
64 Levene, Mark. 2005. The Meaning of Genocide. London: I.B. Tauris, 37.
65 Horowitz, Taking Lives, 27.
66 Ibid, 29.
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The New York Times with the title, “A New Kind of War.”67 The new kind of war we are told, “will 
be a war like none other our nation has faced.” Rumsfeld then frames his discussion in terms of 
disassociations between past wars and this new kind of war, and speculating as to what might be 
the case. “This war will not necessarily be one in which we pore over military targets and mass 
forces to seize those targets. Instead, military force will likely be one of many tools we use to 
stop individuals, groups and countries that engage in terrorism.” Rumsfeld says of the coming 
war: “it is easier to describe what lies ahead by talking about what it is not rather than what it 
is.” In Rumsfeld’s text, dissimilarities far outnumber similarities and additional similarities and 
dissimilarities could be adumbrated. But rather than dismiss the war on terror as it later came to be 
called as no war at all, or not an instance of war because it fails the definitional test of what war is 
in essence, would, I think, be a mistake. 
A third danger, one closely related to the second danger discussed above is clearly illustrated 
in the case of the Rwandan genocide, a genocide that according to the International Panel appointed 
by the Organization of African Unity was, as the title of their report indicates, a preventable 
genocide.68 That report is unequivocal in its central claim that the genocide was preventable.
An unforgivable tragedy for the Tutsi of Rwanda was that the international community 
failed to take a single step to halt the genocide once it began, even though everyone knew 
it was in progress. The first tragedy, however, was the one documented in this chapter. The 
interpretation of the countless individual incidents recorded is surely inescapable: There 
were a thousand early warnings that something appalling was about to occur in Rwanda. If 
not a genocide, it was at least a catastrophe of so great a magnitude that it should command 
international intervention. As we shall see, that intervention was utterly inadequate, largely 
owing to the political interests of the Americans and the French.69
Moreover, and as the report also establishes, the outside world including Belgian colonialism and 
the Catholic Church provided the very building blocks of the Rwandan genocide. 
This is a danger raised by an infantry officer of the Canadian Armed Forces who worked as 
a personal staff officer to Major-General Romé Dallaire in Rwanda in 1993-1994. In a reflection 
published by the officer in 2006, he writes: 
On too many occasions, especially during the genocide in Rwanda and the [then] current 
genocide in Darfur, the organs of the international community have been far more focused 
on conducting some form of academic or legal debate over the use of the word “genocide” to 
describe these catastrophes than on focusing our attention and efforts toward actually doing 
something to stop the killing.70 
As a witness to the events, Major Beardsley had no doubt that he was looking at and seeing 
genocide. 
Finally, an essentialist definition of genocide risks becoming a Procrustean bed insofar as the 
definition does not allow us to see events as genocidal that do not conform to our preconceived 
definition of what constitutes genocide. Or, to extend the Procrustean metaphor a bit further, being 
guided by a clear and rigid definition of genocide raises the possibility that we (mis)shape our 
understanding of genocidal events to coalesce with the Platonic Form. 
The various attempts to redefine genocide are not likely to be successful because the ways in 
which language users employ the term is multifarious and does not, and in fact cannot, I argued, 
be defined in terms of a common essence. “There is nothing identifiably in common for the state 
67 Rumsfeld, Donald H. 2001. “A New Kind of War.” New York Times, 27 September.
68 African Union, Rwanda.
69 Ibid, 9, 16.
70 Beardsley, Brent. 2006. “The Endless Debate over the G Word.” Genocide Studies and Prevention Vol. 1, 79.
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of affairs for which we use a word,” as we are reminded in the Cambridge Lectures.71 Following 
Wittgenstein, using the prism of family resemblances to look at genocide means realizing that our 
use of the term is not fixed, and “there are many kinds of affinity” among our uses of the term; 
moreover it requires that we tolerate a degree of vagueness in our use of the term.
A Wittgensteinian Alternative: Genocide and Family Resemblances
I have laid stress on Wittgenstein’s anti-Platonism to show problems with defining genocide, 
but I have yet to explore exactly how we might approach the concept of genocide through the 
Wittgensteinian prism of family resemblances.
First, and as part of the linguistic turn, we would do well to begin by substituting questions, as 
it were. Instead of asking: “What is genocide?” we might instead ask: “How is the term ‘genocide’ 
used?”72 After we have asked the right question, the next task is to examine the various examples—
and lots of them—of how the term is used—don’t think but look!
We should spare no effort in cataloguing the various ways in which the word genocide is used 
and the all-too-numerous examples of the events and processes we label as genocides. But if we 
are to follow Wittgenstein and catalogue the uses of the term genocide—a formidable task indeed, 
and a task perhaps best left to lexicographers—we would not have accomplished enough. Surely 
we need to do more than collect and catalogue examples of language-use, which after all would be 
merely empirical and therefore of limited value if our endeavour is to understand. What, then, are 
we to do with our collection of examples?
The problem, and it is a considerable one, is that a description, however thorough, remains a 
description, although this is precisely where we begin to discover the criss-cross of patterns, the 
family resemblances. What is missing, or perhaps lost, is any normative dimension, any way of 
distinguishing between the correct and incorrect use of words. Surely in our catalogue of the uses 
of the term genocide we will want to claim that on many occasions the word is used correctly while 
at the same time and on many occasions the word is used incorrectly. But how do we distinguish 
the occasions of correct or incorrect uses of the word? Michael Luntley captures the heart of the 
problem succinctly: “If what you see is what you get, all you are going to get from an account 
of language use for which there is no essence is an account of how things seem. And that does 
not sound as if it is a philosophically interesting account of language use.”73 Can there be, in 
Wittgenstein’s view, a way of distinguishing correct and incorrect use? The short answer is “yes.”
What Wittgenstein is denying, among other things, is the existence of a standard that lies 
outside of how a word is used. That is the heart of his rejection of Platonism. As he says elsewhere: 
“I can characterize my standpoint no better than by saying that it is the antithetical standpoint to 
the one occupied by Socrates in the Platonic dialogues.”74 But this does not preclude the possibility 
that standards for the correct use of a term cannot be found in the uses of the term. Rather than 
despair over the denial of an external or transcendent standard for correct use, we should instead, 
claims Wittgenstein, look for the standard within our keen observations of how the term is used. 
The rule(s) are immanent, not transcendent. The problem then becomes one of making sense of 
rules that are immanent. 
Luntley suggests that there might be two kinds of hidden in this regard.75 While Wittgenstein 
denies a metaphysical realm behind the world of appearance, he nevertheless suggests a realm of 
the hidden within the world of appearance. In a provocative passage at PI §129 he writes:
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity 
and familiarity (my emphasis). (One is unable to notice something—because it is always 
71 Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures, 96.
72 Here my reading of Wittgenstein follows that of Glock: Glock, Hans-Johann. 2010. “Wittgenstein on Concepts.” In 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 88-108. 
73 Luntley, Michael. 2003. Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement. Malden: Blackwell, 50.
74 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2003. The Voices of Wittgenstein: the Vienna Circle. Edited by Gordon Baker. Translated by Gordon 
Baker, Michael Markert, John Connolly, and Vasilis Politis. London: Routledge, 32/33.
75 Luntley, Wittgenstein, 50.
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before one’s eyes). The real foundations of their inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless 
that fact has at some time struck them. –And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once 
seen, is most striking and most powerful.
This passage reveals Wittgenstein’s emphasis on seeing. Luntley is again helpful: “The aim, in 
removing obstacles to this hidden, is not, however, to achieve a statement of the hidden. The aim 
is to achieve a clear sight of this hidden—to see things aright....There is no theoretical explanation, 
there is only a coming to see things aright.”76 
A number of passages in Philosophical Investigations and elsewhere reflect Wittgenstein’s 
emphasis on seeing, and seeing things aright. For example, at PI §130 he writes: “language-games 
stand there as objects of comparison, which through similarities and dissimilarities, are meant to 
throw light on features of our language.” It is in this very activity of seeing things aright that I 
come to see the hidden patterns of correct and incorrect use of words. There are also passages in 
Wittgenstein that suggest the impossibility of giving a theoretical account of correct or incorrect 
use of terms: “If I have learned to carry out a particular activity in a particular room (putting the 
room in order, say) and I am master of this technique, it does not follow that I must be ready to 
describe the arrangement of the room; even if I should at once notice, and could also describe, any 
alteration in it.”77 Similarly: “It could very well be imagined that someone knows his way around 
a city perfectly, i.e. would confidently find the shortest way from anyplace in it to any other, and 
yet would be incompetent to draw a map of the city. That as soon as he tries, he produces nothing 
that is not completely wrong.”78
If Wittgenstein is suggesting or claiming that one can know in the sense of seeing, but is 
nonetheless unable to explain, how does one communicate that which she knows without being 
able to explain what she knows?
To answer this question we need to recall Socrates’ claim that in lieu of a definition, Euthyphro 
is only offering examples. For Wittgenstein, and consonant with his anti-Platonism, examples 
are precisely where one does begin. In trying to teach one what something is, rather than offer a 
definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, one instead shows. 
From the criss-cross of family resemblances, the similarities and differences, we begin to 
see the normative patterns that enable us to possess a concept; the normative patterns that show 
us the correct and incorrect use of a word begin with the examples. In Luntley’s language, the 
examples are the starting point, or the primitive. “To say that seeing the similarities between 
things is primitive is to say that the normative patterns of correct use of words emerge from the 
activity of seeing similarities....The patterns of correct use are not transcendent of actual use. They 
are immanent.”79 Then in order to show” someone what the concept of genocide is, instead of an 
explanation, we show by examples. Wittgenstein, in discussing games at PI §69, says this: “How 
would we explain to someone what a game is? I think we’d describe games to him, and we might 
add to the description: ‘This and similar things are called games.’”80 Analogously, we might say 
of a word like genocide, “Here are descriptions of genocides; these and similar things are called 
genocides.”
Does the introduction of this and similar things makes this too vague, too inexact? Wittgenstein 
clearly thinks not. In the same paragraph he says, “and do we know anymore about ourselves? 
Is it just that we can’t tell others exactly what a game is?—But this is not ignorance. We don’t 
know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary—for a 
special purpose. Does it take this to make the concept usable? Not at all!”81 Two points need to be 
made: one is explicit; the other is more implicit, but equally important. The first point is simply 
76 Luntley, Wittgenstein, 51.
77 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1981. Zettel. Edited by G.E.M Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, §119.
78 Ibid, §121.
79 Luntley, Wittgenstein, 70.
80 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §68.
81 Drawing boundaries for prosecutorial purposes might be just such a case.
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that Wittgenstein implores us to tolerate or even embrace a lack of boundaries, a vagueness in 
our use of concepts. Doing so does not make a concept unusable. Second is the suggestion that as 
language users we are who establish boundaries; we make the rules, not arbitrarily, but in our use 
of language. 
To begin looking at genocide using the notion of family resemblances requires that we look 
and see how language users use the term “genocide.” This requires casting a wide net. Lemkin and 
others use the term to characterize events as far back as the beginnings of human history. Others 
such as Colin Tatz use the term when discussing the treatment of Aborigines by the Australian 
government throughout most of the twentieth century, a genocide of assimilation involving 
relatively little direct killing. We might need to examine the transfer of millions of Germans the 
years immediately following World War II. As R.M. Douglas observes:
The Genocide Convention...being drafted by the UN’s Economic and Social Committee, 
assisted by a legal team, was watered down in response to U.S. pressure. Its first draft had 
defined “forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group” as a 
form of genocide. The U.S. delegate strongly opposed this clause, pointing out that it “might 
be interpreted as embracing forced transfers of minority groups such as have already been 
carried out by members of the United Nations.” The prohibition on expulsions was accordingly 
deleted from the draft Genocide Convention by a vote of 25 to 16, with four abstentions.82 
Charny cites the bombing of Dresden: between 1942 and 1945, 131 German cities and villages 
were bombed by British and American forces resulting in somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000 
deaths, the majority of whom were women, and another one-fifth of whom were children. As Mary 
Nolan notes, “No one disputes these facts. At issue are British intentions and German memories, 
and properly contextualized memories. Was the air war a legitimate military strategy, pursued 
perhaps to excess, but effective, legal, and moral nonetheless? Or did Britain deliberately target 
civilians to avenge London and Coventry and break civilian morale even when it was questionable 
whether the German war effort was negatively affected.”83 The deliberate targeting of hundreds 
of thousands of unarmed civilians might indeed count as genocidal. From a Wittgensteinian 
perspective we would also need to explore the links and resemblances among more conventional 
cases of genocide and the genocides associated with colonial expansion.84 We would need to look at 
cases of iconoclasm such as the Taliban’s attacks on the Buddhas of Bamiyan.85 By the same token, 
attention would also need to be focused on the destruction of sacred sites of Islam perpetrated by 
Salafi extremists. 
As a next step, and one based on our examination of those events or processes language users 
name genocides, we would, following Wittgenstein, begin to see patterns, a criss-cross of similarities, 
or family resemblances in our uses of the term.86 At the same time we would—as historians do—
recognize the uniqueness and individuality of each genocide. Normatively we would also begin 
to see the misuses of the term as determined by the rules established within the immanent domain 
of language users. The uses, and misuses, of language fall under that which is seen, and does not 
lend itself to theoretical explanation.87 It is in seeing patterns of use that we at the same time see the 
normative dimension of use and decipher the patterns of correct and incorrect use.
82 Douglas, Ray M. 2012. Orderly and humane: the Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 335.
83 Nolan, Mary. 2005. “Air Wars, Memory War” Central European History Vol. 38, 8.
84 Moses, A. Dirk and Daniel Stone, editors. 2013. Colonialism and Genocide. New York: Routledge.
85 Steven Miller claims that the attacks on the two Buddhas “constitute nothing less than an instance of genocide—which 
turns upon political will as the will to completion”, Miller, Steven. 2014. War after Death: On Violence and its Limits. New 
York: Fordham University Press, 31.
86 This parallels Gerlach’s claim, “Where many genocide scholars devote much energy to neatly distinguishing between 
different forms of violence, I am interested in the links between them.” Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies, 464.
87 This is a notoriously difficult and enigmatic part of the Philosophical Investigations and shows among other things how 
radical Wittgenstein’s view is. A full exegesis of his text would take us beyond the scope of this paper.
Don’t Think But Look
©2016     Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 3 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.3.1308
169
This approach might well enhance our understanding by helping us—recalling an earlier 
cited passage from the Philosophical Investigations—to see “a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small.”88 Rather than 
marginalizing some discourses of genocidal violence, a Wittgenstein-inspired approach would 
have us look at a diverse array of events that language users describe as genocides to see that 
criss-cross of similarities. This is, I think, what is beginning to happen in the field of comparative 
genocide studies. Feierstein’s previously discussed book, Genocide as Social Practice, could be read 
as uncovering that pattern of similarities between the Nazi annihilation of European Jews and 
Argentina’s military juntas. Feierstein’s study could then be read, not as claiming to have somehow 
revealed the essence of genocide, but instead as showing us a criss-cross of similarities that we 
might see elsewhere, perhaps in the genocidal violence of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Similarly, 
instead of adopting the methodological isolation of genocide as an isolated and isolatable form of 
human destruction, one could instead, and contra Horowitz, look to war or cultural destruction to 
see patterns and similarities that might well enrich our understanding.
Recalling our earlier discussion of Donald Rumsfeld, we might look at the war on terror 
through a Wittgensteinian lens and look at the criss-crossing of patterns with other things or events 
we call war looking for the family resemblances between this war and other wars. And in that very 
examination of family resemblances we come to see more clearly the depth and complexity of this 
new kind of war. 
So too in the case of genocide: we need to look and see how language-users use the term 
genocide and look closely at those violent events language users call genocide in order to see 
the criss-cross and patterns of those events and processes we call genocide. How perpetrators 
construct and frame targeted groups will vary considerably: in the case of the Armenian genocide 
political elites of the Ottoman Empire such as Mehmet Talât Pasha (mis)framed Armenians as 
armed combatants who committed treason; in Guatemala in the early 1980s genocidal violence was 
a way of countering la subversión of the indigenous Mayan population. By contrast, targeted groups 
in the case of the Cambodian genocide vary, although the various groups presented a challenge 
to Pol Pot’s nationalist revival; as Ben Kieren has shown, these groups included Buddhist monks, 
ethnic minorities including the Vietnamese, Chinese, and Muslim Cham. But and at the same time 
Khmers themselves—the majority population—were also targeted.89 Whereas the targeted group 
is often a minority population as was the case with the Tutsis in Rwanda, members of majority 
populations are not immune to genocidal violence. Similarly, while the focus of the Holocaust 
was on Jew and gypsies, the targeted group also included the handicapped; also included among 
the targeted groups were somewhere between 3 and 4 million Germans held at Dachau and 
other camps; Dachau was the first German camp and was intended—along with its satellite work 
camps—as a camp for Germans. 
We might likewise be mindful of the great diversity of the weaponry or machinery of genocidal 
violence. In the case of the Shoah, great emphasis has been laid on the industrial scale of the killing 
with the use of Zyklon B at Auschwitz, and the use of gas vans at Chelmno. This contrasts with 
use of machetes and other farm implements in the case of Rwanda. Also in Bangladesh, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Rwanda rape became a prominent genocidal weapon .90 I have elsewhere made 
the case that continuing and even escalating denial of the Armenian genocide by Turkish political 
elites and scholars, along with the destruction of Armenian public architecture, is a genocidal 
weapon.
88 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §66.
89 Kiernan, Ben. 2008. The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979. Third edition. New 
Haven: Yale University Press; Kiernan, Ben. 2008. Genocide and Resistance in Southeast Asia: Documentation, Denial, and 
Justice in Cambodia and East Timor. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
90 Stiglmayer, Alexandra, editor. 1993. Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Translated by Marion 
Faber. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press; Nowrojee, Binaifer. 1996. Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan 
Genocide and its Aftermath. Human Rights Watch/Africa, Human Rights Watch Women’s Rights Project, Fédération 
Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, Human Rights Watch. Available from http:/www.hrw.org/reports/1996/
Rwanda.htm (accessed December 16, 2015).
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Since intent and intent to destroy figure so centrally in our understanding of genocidal 
violence, the notion of family resemblances would allow us to move beyond the legalistic 
concerns of establishing or failing to establish intent and ask us to look carefully at the criss-cross 
of patterns of intention; in other words we would look at the similarities and dissimilarities of 
reasons perpetrators want to destroy a targeted group. The need to recognize a variety of genocidal 
purposes is recognized by Chalk and Jonassohn although their list of genocidal purposes could 
well be expanded with the lens of family resemblances.91
This brief discussion is by no means intended as any sort of comparative analysis of the 
genocides discussed herein; my purpose is to instead highlight certain key differences to serve as 
a reminder of a sometimes high degree of difference among individual genocides which in turn 
suggest that in looking forward we need to be open to the possibility of new horizons of genocidal 
violence.
Conclusion
A number of concerns and objections might we be brought against both my reading of the later 
Wittgenstein, as well as my argument that using Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances can 
help enrich our understanding of genocide. The former objection in part rests at least in part on 
the fact that the later writings are enigmatic and therefore subject to a range of interpretations; 
the latter objection is by no means ill-founded insofar as it raises new problems for genocide 
scholarship. To the first concern I would argue that my reading of Wittgenstein, more so than 
much of the commentary, focuses on the visual, the demand that we look and see; my emphasis 
on the visual is, I would argue, grounded in the text, and as I have argued, precisely what is 
illuminative about a Wittgenstian approach to genocide. A second and reasonable objection to 
the approach I have argued for is that we would risk an all-too-vague conception of genocide that 
would fail to sustain strong moral condemnation and effective political action. In response to the 
claim that it would undercut or weaken the grounds for moral condemnation, I would argue that 
moral condemnation does in no way require a strict and exclusionary definition of a concept. On 
the contrary, if we exclude by definition events or processes from our purview and subscribe to 
the view that genocide is, among other things, the worst of all crimes, we risk discounting the 
degree of moral condemnation that many events and processes demand. As I argued earlier, in a 
juridical context a reasonably precise definition is indicated if not required; such is not required for 
moral condemnation. Moreover, for purposes of understanding and attempting to lessen genocidal 
violence, we have only to benefit from casting a wider net. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
paper, I would also argue that a notion of genocide understood in terms of family resemblances 
could likely expedite intervention, if not by nation-states bound by international law, certainly 
by NGOs and a host of organizations such as Genocide Watch that are committed to anticipating 
genocides in the future. Finally, it might be objected that a Wittgensteinian approach to genocide 
would do little if anything to counter the political uses and misuses of the term. On the one hand, 
as we learn from Foucault’s lectures at the in Collège de France 1975-1976, he argues that “in 
the course of the eighteenth century...historical discourse eventually became a sort of discursive 
weapon that could be used by all the adversaries present within the political field.92 Yet on the other 
hand, taking Foucault’s claim to heart, we might well be able to see in the immanent domain the 
very rules that would help us to identify political misuses of the term. 
We have good reasons not to want to see genocide. Reading the opening pages of Charlotte 
Delbo’s Days and Memory, or Primo Levi’s reflections on useless violence almost inevitably elicits 
a frisson of horror, as does the testimony of perpetrators, be they the words of Franz Stangl in 
his interviews with Gitta Sereny, or Jean Hatzfeld’s interviews with perpetrators in Rwanda. So 
too with the reports by Fergal Keane or the photographs of James Nachtwey or Gilles Peress. 
Truly seeing genocide might be more than we can bear; it might amount to a horrifying look 
91 Chalk, Frank and Kurt Jonassohn. 1990. History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.
92 Foucault, Michel. 1997. “Society Must be Defended.” Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976. Translated by David 
Macey. New York: Picador.
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in the mirror. One way of not seeing genocidal violence is to hide it, to define it or frame it in 
such a way that some genocides are definitionally or methodologically dismissed and hidden. 
But look we must. Following Wittgenstein I have argued that we might well look for the family 
resemblances among those events and processes in order to discover the affinities [Verwandschaften] 
between and among them rather than insisting that genocidal events or processes have an 
essence. As hinted at earlier in this paper, I see work going on in the relatively new field of 
Genocide Studies as moving in that direction, but only partially. I have argued that Wittgenstein’s 
notion of family resemblances might help us to see that which we have reason to hide.
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